加拿大外贸
1 IntroductionEvidence of earnings management has been documented for a variety of public equity
offerings. It has been shown around IPOs by Teoh et al. (1998a) and DuCharme et al.
(2004), around SEOs by Teoh et al. (1998b), Rangan (1998), and Jo and Kim (2007) and
around reverse LBOs (i.e., second IPOs) by Chou et al. (2006). Furthermore, these studies
D.-W. Chou
Yuan-Ze University, Taoyuan, Taiwan, ROC
e-mail: [email protected]
M. Gombola (&)
Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
F.-Y. Liu
Rider University, Lawrenceville, NJ, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2010) 34:225-245
DOI 10.1007/s11156-009-0129-8
provide evidence of a negative relation between earnings management and post-issue stock
return performance. The evidence leads to a conclusion that earnings management can
explain, at least in part, stock price performance following public equity issuance.
Unlike IPOs and SEOs, earnings management around private placements of equity
might be more limited. Managers of firms issuing private equity might have limited
opportunity to manage earnings due to limited information asymmetry between informed
private placement investors and managers of firms issuing equity privately. Managers
might also have limited time to manage earnings prior to a private placement when the
private placement is arranged quickly in order to raise unforeseen funds.
Managers of firms issuing equity privately might still practice earnings management,
just like IPOs and SEOs, and choose to compensate informed private placement investors,
who can see through earnings management, with substantial discounts of the market price.1
Outside investors, who cannot detect earnings management, could be deceived by the
private placement announcement. When earnings management is later reversed, these
outside investors could be disappointed by the lower-than-expected earnings, leading to
poor long-run stock price performance. This view is consistent with the investor overop-
timism hypothesis presented by Teoh et al. (1998a) for public offerings and applied to
private placements by Hertzel et al. (2002).
Teoh et al. (1998a, b) argue that earnings management could be used as a device to
heighten investor optimism about the performance and future prospects of issuing firms. If
investor optimism is heightened in the presence of earnings management, then we should
expect a positive relation between the extent of earnings management at the private
placement and the magnitude of post-offering underperformance following private equity
placements. Hertzel et al. (2002) report underperformance for their sample of private
equity placements during the period between1980 and 1996.
The objective of this study is to investigate whether managers of firms issuing private
equity manage earnings upward and whether the earnings management explanation for
long-run stock performance of public issues also holds for private issues. We measure
earnings management by two proxies, discretional current accruals (DCA) estimated by the
modified Jones (1991) model and DCA estimated based on the performance-matched
approach espoused by Kothari et al. (2005). We do not find significant evidence of earnings
management for our overall sample of equity private placements from either measure of
DCA.
评论
·······这是啥？？
评论
有证据表明盈余管理和股票收益之间存在着消极的关系。根据这些证据我们可以得出一个结论：盈余管理，至少在一定程度上，可以影响一个公司发行的股票的价格。跟IPO和SEO不同，私人配售股权的盈余管理存在一定的局限性。在私自发行股权的公司，由于消息灵通的股权持有者与该公司管理者之间有信息不对等性有限，该公司管理者对公司的盈余的管理的机会也是有限的。有时为了募得计划外的资金而很仓促地进行私人配售股权，此时该公司 的管理者就会没有充分的时间在该交易进行对盈余进行管理。。。。
不翻了，烦死啦~~~~
评论
太多啦。。。头晕。。。
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