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2.5 WTO Rules on SubsidiesThe WTO limits members’ use of subsidies and also actions that members can take in response to subsidies used by other member countries. Subsidies specifically designed to distort international trade are prohibited (WTO website).15 Other subsidies are permitted unless a complaining country can show that it is adversely affected. Specifically, subsidies designed to ease adjustment by facilitating movement of productive factors out of a US industry that has lost comparative advantage would thus be permitted as long as they did not (a) hurt a domestic industry in an importing country, (b) hurt exporters in another country trying to compete in the US market, or (c) hurt rival exporters from another country in competition in a third market.
Given these grounds for a complaint, subsidies designed to restore the comparative advantage of a declining US industry would run a greater chance of being challenged by another WTO member than subsidies designed to encourage exit. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Body agrees that the US subsidies have adverse effects on another member, the US would have to withdraw its subsidies or otherwise eliminate the adverse effects. In the case of subsidies that hurt domestic producers in another country, that country could impose a countervailing duty.
2.6 Section 301
While the provisions discussed above are concerned mainly with situations in which a US firm is injured by competing imports, Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 addresses foreign practices that unfairly exclude US products from export markets. At least in principle it offers away to promote US adjustment to shifting comparative advantage by ensuring that firms in emerging export sectors are able to find markets abroad. In fact, most of the industries represented in 301 cases seem improbable as reflections of emerging US comparative advantage.
The statute requires imposition of trade sanctions16 when the US Trade Representative
determines that a foreign country has violated or denied US rights under trade agreements, or has engaged in “unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory acts, policies, or practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.” Under some other circumstances, retaliation is discretionary.
In the case of foreign “targeting,” governments may provide subsidies to exporters
competing with US exporters in their own domestic market or in third markets. In this case, the US cannot respond with a countervailing duty. Under Section 301, the USTR is directed to “establish an advisory panel to recommend measures which will promote the competitiveness of the domestic industry affected by the export targeting” [§ 2415 (b) (1) (A)].
While no other areas of the statute have as clear a potential link to adjustment, there are certainly ways of structuring actions taken under Section 301 that would either encourage adjustment out of the domestic industry or facilitate its expansion. For example, although it is not politically likely, USTR could choose to retaliate over imported inputs needed by the petitioning domestic industry and thus encourage a shift out of this activity. Alternatively, USTR could encourage expansion of the domestic industry by choosing retaliation targets that benefits the domestic industry. For example, in the Beef-Hormones 301 case, USTR chose to retaliate over imports of EU bovine and swine meat.
Both the perceived need for Section 301 and its potential scope have been reduced since the WTO was established in 1995. However, a 1999 WTO panel rejected EU claims that Section 301 procedures were not consistent with US WTO obligations.
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